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Nate Knuffman 
Environmental Commitment Among the States 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last three decades, the environment has become established as a major issue on the American political agenda (Elliot, Regens, and Seldon 
1995). Into the 1970s, rising public concern about threats to the environment resulted in changes in government policies at all levels. The US adopted 
an extensive number of major environmental and resource policies which imposed increasingly stringent standards on industry. New institutions, like 
the US Environmental Protection Agency, were created to manage environmental programs and spending was greatly increased for these programs. 
However, under the Reagan administration in the 1980s, a conservative policy agenda was implemented which accelerated devolution and resulted in 
large cuts in the budgets of the EPA and other agencies. 
 
This "New Federalism" has definitely had its effects on the role of the states in the policy process, especially in the area of environmental policy 
(Vig, Kraft 1994). "At the very least, the Reagan administration's decentralization policy suggests an increased emphasis on the role of the states in 
environmental management" (Lester 1990). Research into the extent to which the states have met this challenge has shown a wide variance in 
commitment to environmental protection among the states. The purpose of this research is to address why some states are more committed to 
environmental protection than others. More specifically, this research deals with how economic factors and political influences affect environmental 
policy outputs among states. 
 
Research attempting to explain the variance in commitment to environmental protection among states is important for various reasons. In accounting 
for the determinants of state environmental commitment, we are able to evaluate state government's responsiveness. Which interests are responded to 
in policymaking? Identification of these factors also may allow evaluation of the capacity of state governments to deal with serious environmental 
problems. Understanding why states behave in certain manners provides a solid base for formulating political strategies that might influence deficient 
states to become more responsive. This is particularly important in an era of political devolution. 
 
Theory and Literature Review 
 
This research differs from previous studies for several reasons. Most studies on comparative environmental commitment across states have examined 
specific policies, while my research seeks to understand state commitment to protection more broadly. This is not an attempt to question the validity 
or 
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usefulness of more specific policy analyses. However, broad-based measures of policy commitment are also important. After all, certain states may 
excel in one specific area of protection, while remaining deficient in many others (Hays et al 1996). Studies that have attempted to assess states' 
commitment to a full range of environmental policies, (e.g. Hays et al 1996), have not measured state environmental policy in both fiscal and 
non-fiscal measures, which is strongly recommended for future research by James Lester (1990). Research which incorporates both measures (Agthe, 
Billings, and Marchand 1996) has typically excluded important theoretical variables such as industrialization, public opinion liberalism, and political 
culture. In fact, no previous research appears to have incorporated political culture. 
 
There exists a substantial amount of literature pertaining to the causes of variance among states in policy outputs. The various determinants, which 
have been theoretically developed and often used in previous research, can be classified into two major groups: economic factors and political 
influences. 
 
Economic Factors 
 
Economic factors have been found as important determinants in various past studies. Thomas Dye (1966) and Winters (1976) determined that 
economic variables are the best and usually the only significant predictors of state policy. The "ability-to-pay" theory asserts that states with greater 
economic resources are assumed to spend more on environmental protection. The logic behind this assertion stems from the idea that states with 
more money can more likely afford services and can innovate with responsive new techniques. Various studies have shown that a state's economic 
resources are related to environmental protection. States with higher per capita income have been found to be more committed to specific policy 
areas in hazardous waste (Lester et al 1983) and air and water pollution policies by Ringquist (1994) and Lowry (1992). Assuming environmental 
quality to be a normal good, we would expect an individual's demand for environmental quality to rise with income. Diagram I displays this situation: 
 
We see that a rise in an individual's budget constraint from A to B leads to an increase in his desired level of environmental quality from q to q. A 
wealthier person would want to purchase more environmental quality. Therefore, theory and past research suggest that wealthier states will be more 
committed to environmental protection. 
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Figure I 
Environmental Quality as a Normal Good 
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The "severity" argument suggests that extensive industrialization and concentrated population create severe pollution problems, which creates strong 
pressures for environmental protection commitment. It may seem logical to assume that manufacturing firms would oppose environmental regulation 
because of increased costs in production. However, manufacturing firms may favor regulation because the regulatory costs and policies act as barriers 
to entry, causing new, smaller firms to face high regulatory costs when competing for the established firms' markets. Williams and Matheny (1984) 
argue that businesses, especially large oligopolistic firms, are more likely to support socialization of the costs of production. These theories seem 
consistent with research showing that states with large numbers of manufacturing firms are more likely to have stronger air and water protection 
policies (Ringquist 1994; Lowry 1992). Consequently, it is expected that more industrialized states will have a stronger commitment to 
environmental protection. 
 
 This "severity" argument also asserts that concentrated population causes an increase in pollution problems, which ultimately applies pressure to 
better meet environmental protection. However, this concentration of population may allow states to spend less per capita and exert less effort at 
policy delivery in more urban areas due to economies of scale. Research findings of Agthe, Billings, and Marchand (1996) support this theory. Yet 
with theoretical arguments in both directions, an increased level of urbanization in a state may increase or decrease commitment to environmental 
protection. 
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Political Influences 
 
The greatest evidence for claiming a significant role for the influence of political variables in state policy extends from research done by Erikson, 
Wright. and McIver (1989). They found that state opinion liberalism had a strong impact on public policy in the states, both directly and indirectly, 
even when controlling for economic variables. Liberal ideology tends to look more favorably upon environmental regulation. Since state policy 
should reflect the attitudes and priorities of a state's people, it seems logical to expect that the greater the percentage of people who identify 
themselves as liberal in a state, the stronger that state's commitment to environmental protection. 
 
A measure of the professionalism of a state legislature has often been used in previous research in comparative state policy. More professional state 
legislatures will be more responsive to citizen needs and more innovative in policymaking (Grumm 197 1). Better educated members, expanded 
resources, and more staff support should allow professional legislatures to be able to better examine issues, resulting in more innovative and 
comprehensive policies. These advantages should be particularly beneficial in the complex and technical area of environmental protection, with a 
more activist legislature seeking a stronger commitment to environmental protection. Therefore, theory and past research suggest that states with 
more professionalized legislatures will be more committed to environmental protection. 
 
Political culture has never been directly included in previous research. Yet there is strong theoretical support for the effect of political culture to be 
included in research examining the variance of commitment among states. Political culture is an aspect of a state's political environment that is 
independent of such concepts as ideology and regionalism. Political culture is particularly important as the historical source of differences among 
various states in concerns, habits, and attitudes that exist to influence political life (Elazar 1966). It can be defined as "the particular pattern of 
orientation to political action in which each political system is embedded." (Elazar 1966). In "moralistic" political cultures, individualism is tempered 
by a general commitment to advancing the public interest. The government is considered a positive instrument with a responsibility to promote the 
general welfare (Elazar 1966). This contrasts the "traditionalist" political culture, which views government intervention in a negative light. The 
moralistic outlook facilitates a greater commitment to active government intervention. This theory can be applied to the realm of government 
intervention in environmental protection, especially considering that the environment is often considered a public good. Consequently, it is expected 
that moralistic states will be more committed to environmental protection than non-moralistic states. 
 
Organized interests have often been thought to have an important and distinct influence on the political process. Lindblom (1977) claims that domi 
 
Res Publica  19 
 
nant groups and interests have the ability to control the political agenda. Research shows that groups like the Sierra Club have had a large amount of 
influence on program content and implementation at the national level (Meinick 1983). Previous research at the state level also indicates that 
well-organized interest groups are more committed to hazardous waste policy (Lester et al 1983) and to overall environmental regulation (Hays et al 
1996). The rationale behind the influence of these organized interests centers on the growth in public support for environmental protection and rapid 
increase in tile membership of environmental interest groups, which suggests political pressure should greatly influence policymakers' commitment 
to environmental protection (Mitchell 1990). Theory and past research suggest that tile greater the environmental interest group power within a state, 
the more commitment that state will have to environmental protection. 
Therefore, the hypotheses examined in this research are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Wealthier states will be more committed to environmental protection than less wealthy states. 
Hypothesis 2: More industrialized states will have a stronger commitment to environmental protection than less industrialized states. 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the percentage of state opinion liberalism, the stronger that state's commitment to environmental protection. 
Hypothesis 4: States with more professionalized legislatures will be more committed to environmental protection than those with less 
professionalized legislatures. 
Hypothesis 5: Moralistic states will be more committed to environmental protection than non-moralistic states. 
Hypothesis 6: The greater the environmental interest group power within a state, the more commitment that state will have to environmental 
protection. 
 
Derivation Of Empirical Model 
 
My research incorporates two separate, standard regression models to test these hypotheses on two types of measures (fiscal and non-fiscal) for 
environmental commitment. The dependent variable, state commitment to environmental protection, will be measured fiscally by state per capita 
spending on the environment and non-fiscally by the Green Policy Initiatives Index. State spending data was gathered from the Council of State 
Governments. This measure has been used in various past research involving the assessment of comparative state environmental policy, including 
recent research done by Agthe, Billings, and Marchand ( 1994) and Dawes and Bacot (1996). The Green Policy Initiatives Index is based on the 
number of innovative environmental and natural resource policies each state has adopted. This measure is the most recently developed and tile 
broadest measure of state environmental policy commitment, reflecting a state's position relative to others 
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based on seventy-seven indicators (Hays et al 1996). These indicators repre sent the presence or absence of various innovative policies in recycling, 
land fills, toxic waste, air and water pollution, energy and transportation, and agri culture (Hall and Kerr 1994). This measure has been used to 
measure slat environmental commitment in recent research by Lester (1994) and Hays et a] ( 1996). It has also been found to be highly correlated 
(.88) with the other popular index (FREE) used in recent comparative state environmental research Therefore, this index should be a valid 
representation of commitment to the environment at the state level. 
 
My independent variables were operationalized in various ways. The variable used to represent wealth is income per capita. It is the most widely 
used and accepted measure. Industrialization is represented as the percentage of employees in the manufacturing sector of a state. This measure, used 
by Hays et al (1996), had significant effects. The independent variable reflecting urbanization is measured as the percentage of people living in urban 
areas. Agthe, Billings, and Marchand (1994) used this measure and found its influence to be significant. State opinion liberalism is measured as a 
percentage (liberal % - conservative %) taken from the pooled time-series data used by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993). Legislative 
professionalism is measured by a legislative professionalism factor score, which was developed by Squire. It is the most recently developed measure 
and is highly correlated with the other previously developed factor scores measuring legislative professionalism. It is based on three resource 
variables: legislator pay, staff per legislator and total days the legislature is in session. Political culture type is measure by Daniel Elazar's 
classification of states and allows for the use of a dummy variable for moralistic v. non-moralistic states. Environmental interest group strength 
within a state is measured as state membership in the Sierra Club per 1000 population. The definitions of the independent variables and their 
expected relationships with environmental commitment are described in Table I. 
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Table I 
Variable Definitions and Expected Relationships 
 
Variable  Definition Expected Sign 
Wealth  State Income Per CapitaPositive 
(income) 
 
Industrialization  Number of Employees in the Positive 
(manuf)  Manufacturing Sector of a State per 
 1000 population 
 
Urbanization 
(%urban)   Living in Urban Areas ? 
 
OpinionLiberatism  EWM's %of Liberal Identifiers Positive 
(%liberal)   minus % of Conservative Identifiers 
 
Legislative  Squire's factor scorePositive 
Professionalism 
(legprof) 
 
Moralistic Culture  Elazar's ClassificationPositive 
(moral) 
 
Environmental  State Membership in Sierra Club per Positive 
Interest Group  1000 population 
Strength 
(envint) 
 
Model I 
 
Model 1, which used the non-fiscal measure of the dependent variable (Green Policy Initiatives Index), performed very well. Four of the seven 
independent variables were statistically significant and the adjusted R square was a relatively high .72106, meaning that approximately 72 percent of 
the variance in the dependent variable could be explained by these seven independent variables. Of the economic variables, income was significant at 
the .05 level and manufacturing employment was significant at the .0 1 level, therefore supporting my hypotheses regarding these variables. The 
political variables of legislative professionalism and environmental interest group membership were both significant at the .01 level. This confirms 
my hypotheses that legislative professionalism and environmental interest group power are positively related to environmental commitment. The 
single most powerful predictor of state commitment to the environment in the model was environmental interest group power (beta weight .347947). 
Overall, all of the signs of the inde 
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pendent variables in the model indicated a positive relationship with environmental commitment except urbanicity, which had no predicted sign. 
 
My results are comparable to those of Hays (1996). She also used the Green Policy Initiatives Index and some similar independent variables. My 
results regarding the political variables of legislative professionalism and environmental interest group membership further support Hays' findings 
that both variables were significant determinants of state commitment to the environment. However, the results of our economic variables were 
different. Manufacturing employment and income did not have statistically significant positive relationships in her research, while they did prove 
statistically significant in this research. 
 
My results regarding the importance of income support the previous findings by Lester (1983), Ringquist (1994), and Lowry (1992), who have found 
income to be positively associated with state air and water pollution policies. The significance of legislative professionalism and environment interest 
group membership further supports research done by Ringquist (1994), who found that both variables were associated with stronger state air and 
water pollution policies. 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 2, which used a fiscal measure (state government per capita spending on environment) of state commitment to the environment, did not 
perform as well as Model 1. Three of the independent variables were significant and the adjusted R square was .48548, meaning that about 49 percent 
of the variance in per capita state government expenditures on the environment can be explained by these independent variables. The only 
statistically significant political variable was the measure of moralistic political culture, which was significant to the .05 level. This result does 
confirm my hypothesis that states of moralistic political culture are more environmentally committed compare to states of non-moralistic culture. Its 
coefficient indicates that states of moralistic political culture spend about 17 dollars more per capita on the environment than non-moralistic states. 
My hypotheses regarding the other political variables of state ideology, environmental interest group strength, and legislative professionalism were 
not confirmed by the results of this model. 
 
Among the economic variables, manufacturing, employment an urbanicity were statistically significant to the.01 and .05 levels. The urbanicity 
coefficient indicates that a one percent increase in a state's population living  in urban areas corresponds to about an $.82 decrease in state spending 
on the environment per capita. The result of the urbanicity variable supports the economies of scale theory. Evidently, a concentration of population 
does allow state to spend less per capita and exert less effort at policy delivery. It could also indicate that more urbanized states simply spend less on 
the environment. 
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Manufacturing employment was also a significant determinant of state spending on the environment, but the relationship was in the opposite 
direction as expected. The possible reasons behind this result will be discussed in detail later. 
 
Before discussing the possible reasons behind these unexpected results and the comparisons between the two models, the inherent differences 
between these two measures of state commitment to the environment must be realized. Both represent types of policy measures of state 
environmental commitment but each represent different aspects of policy decision-making. A state that spends a great amount on the environment 
has not necessarily implemented a broad range of innovative environmental policies and vice versa. State expenditure on the environment is a raw 
measure of government spending, while the GPI Index is based on specific policy indicators on a wide range of new and innovative environmental 
policies and may be a more valid gauge of environmental commitment. 
 
The major problem variable of Model 2 was manufacturing employment-the proxy for industrial ization-because it was statistically significant in the 
opposite direction as expected. Reconciling why this variable would have a significant positive relationship in one model and a significant negative 
relationship in the other model is important to consider. One interpretation is that as states become more industrialized, an increase in the amount of 
policy innovativeness is favored, while raw government spending on the environment is opposed. These new and innovative policies may tend to 
translate into barriers to entry in the market, therefore explaining why a more industrialized state may favor an increase in policy innovations. These 
same industrial benefits may not be realized by an increase in state government spending on the environment. 
 
This result should not necessarily be rigidly understood that as a state becomes more industrialized, the level of state policy innovati veness increases 
while state government spending on the environment decreases, Much of the favor a more industrialized state may place on environmental 
commitment may be contingent upon the specific policies, relegating who bears the costs of cleanup, and the types of environmental spending 
particular to that state. Industrialization is certainly an important determinant of state commitment to the environment, however its direction of effect 
may depend on the specific environmental policies and spending programs of a particular state. 
 
These results are most comparable to two recent studies, Agthe, Billings, and Marchand (1994) and Bacot and Dawes (1996), because they also used 
state environmental spending as a dependent variable. However, many of the independent variables used in both of their studies were different from 
the factors included in my model. Bacot and Dawes (1996) also found income and liberal ideology to have statistically insignificant effects. They did 
find 
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 Table 2 
Results: Model I (GPI Index) / Model 2 (Env. Spending/Capita) 
 
MODEL1 MODEL2 
 
Variable  Coefficient       BetaCoeff icient  Beta 
 
Income   0.001794 .347914**0.000268  0.025353 
Manuf   0.147221 .254407***-0.605427  -.508826*** 
Urban   -0.023428 -0.02362-0.818241  -.401205** 
 
EnvInt   5.074076 .347947***1.919296  0.06401 
 
LegProf   26.618938 .268141***-12.629971  -0.061876 
 
Moral   2.69878 0.08968616.870212  .272662** 
 
Liberal   0.116363 0.060055-0.440328  -0.110524 
 
 Adjusted R Square: .72106  Adjusted R Square: .48548        (*)significant at the .10 level     
 (*)significantat the .10 level    (**)significant at the .05 level (**)significantat the .05 level 
 (***)significant at the .01 level  (*** )significant at the .01 level 
 
environmental interest group strength to be an important influence, however the relationship was insignificant in my Model 2. The 
significant importance of urbanicity in my Model 2 further supports research done by Agthe, Billings, and Marchand (1994), who 
found urbanicity to be significant and negatively related to state environmental spending. 
 
It is interesting to evaluate the similarities and differences between the results of these two models. The only variable that did not exert 
a statistically 
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significant influence in either model was public liberal ideology. Within the limits of my research, a state's political ideology has little to do with its 
environmental commitment, despite its proven importance in various other policy research at the state and national level. 
 
The variables that were statistically significant in one model and maintained their direction of influence in both models were income, moralistic 
political culture, environmental interest group strength, and urbanicity. These results support the ability-to-pay theory; higher levels of income are 
associated with greater state environmental commitment. States of moralistic political culture appear more committed to pro-environmental policies 
than nonmoralistic political culture types. Apparently, the moralistic culture does indeed have a more positive view of governmental intervention in 
the realm of environmental protection. State environmental interest group strength is positively related to environmental effort. Evidently, stronger 
environmental representation maintains environmental issues' importance, which translates into sustained environmental priorities at the state level. 
Both models also find that a decrease in a state's environmental commitment is associated with an increase in urbanicity. An increase in state 
urbanicity may allow economies of scale to be utilized in policy delivery or simply indicate that more urbanized states are less committed to the 
environment. 
 
Legislative professionalism only exerted a significant impact in Model 1, which demonstrates that it is positively associated with greater state 
environmental commitment, at least when evaluating commitment in terms of the implementation of a broad range of specific and innovative 
environmental policies. More resources and staff support for legislatures does allow them to better implement a more comprehensive range of new 
environmental policies. Industrialization was significant in both models, however not in the expected direction in Model 2. A discussion of this result 
and possible explanations can be found earlier. Nevertheless, industrialization is an important determinant of state environmental commitment. 
 
This comparison of results between both models can be related to tile only previous research that incorporated a fiscal and non-fiscal measure of 
environmental effort, Agthe, Billings, and Marchand (1994). Overall, they found that economic variables were more powerful determinants of a 
fiscal measure of environmental commitment (spending), while political variables had more predictive power when commitment was measured 
non-fiscally (policy index). My research supports this idea that economic variables are more powerful determinants of a fiscal measure of 
commitment. In Model 2, two of the three economic variables were significant and the most powerful, while only one of the four political variables 
was statistically significant. My research does not, however, provide any conclusive evidence that political variables were more powerful 
determinants of a non-fiscal measure of environmental commitment, In Model 1, two economic and two political variables were significant and the 
respective beta weights of both classes of variables were very similar, indicating very comparable predictive strengths.
 
 
Conclusion 
The results of my research are very widespread across both models, which should not be interpreted as meaning there is nothing valuable to gain 
from this study. Rather, this research indicates that a different combination of political and economic factors influence policy initiative and 
innovativeness as compared to environmental spending. The only factor that does not seem to have any affect on state environmental effort is liberal 
ideology, at least when controlling for the other influences in my research. The most powerful determinants of policy innovativeness were 
industrialization, legislative professionalism, and environmental interest group strength. States rich in these areas seem to have the most conducive 
environment for policy initiative and innovativeness. It also seems that states are responsive to environmental interest groups, with this factor being 
the most powerful predictor of policy initiative and innovativeness. However, state spending on the environment is largely a function of different 
economic and political factors. Urbanicity, industrialization, and moralistic political culture were the most powerful determinants of environmental 
spending. 
 
There are various possible reasons why these two types of measures of environmental commitment are driven by different combinations of political 
and economic factors. Both are policy measures, but the non-fiscal measure (GPI index) deals with the comprehensive and innovative nature of 
environmental policy, while the fiscal measure (environmental spending) is based on the money allocated by the state government for the 
environment. This variance may have resulted because these measures are truly measuring different aspects of policy decision-making; a state that is 
more innovative with regard to environmental policy does not necessarily spend more on the environment Another possible reason behind this 
discrepancy may be the use of unfunded mandates. Unfunded mandates can be federal mandates delineating certain state environmental standards 
without any additional funding. Therefore, a state could be forced to initiate environmental policies to coordinate with federal standards or choose to 
innovate policies to reach beyond the federal guidelines, while not necessarily allocating more money for the environment. 
 
Future research in this area could be improved in several ways. A fiscal measure of environmental commitment could possibly also incorporate the 
amount of government allocation for the environment relative to aggregate state spending. A state with stronger environmental commitment would 
presumably allocate more money for the environment relative to aggregate spending. This would provide a supplemental fiscal measure of 
commitment as 
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dependent variable. Also, to possibly measure ideology more effectively, the ideology of the actual state legislators (elite ideology) may need to be 
used in addition to or in place of a public ideology measure. It is possible that the ideological preferences of the elected legislators are not reflective 
of the public ideology, which could possibly translate into a much different impact on policy decisions. 
 
Future research in this area could be improved by possibly including a more direct measure of the environmental problem severity among states. 
Logically, a state's commitment to the environment will be greatly affected by the severity of that state's environmental problems. However, much of 
a state's environmental problems may only be particular to that state or region. Further, a state's environmental problems may have resulted from 
interstate influences, such as the movement of air and water pollution across state lines. Consequently, the difficulty surrounding environmental 
problem severity lies in capturing a valid measure. 
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